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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Should the Court uphold the trial court's ruling on the 
motion to suppress, even though Defendant's counsel failed to 
appear for the hearing, when the Defendant through counsel 
submitted his position in writing which position failed as a matter 
of law to provide a basis to suppress the evidence? 
II. Should the Court affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to suppress where the probation officer properly 
entered a home where a probationer was residing and, after seeing 
and smelling marijuana in the residence, obtained a search warrant 
and, based on the search authorized by the warrant, located 
marijuana in the home? 
III. Was there probable cause supporting the warrant based on 
the officers' smelling marijuana in the home and viewing in plain 
sight a substance believed to be marijuana, and the probationer's 
admission of drug use in the home? 
IV. Does the absence of the original search warrant in the 
record negate the warrant, where it is undisputed that the trial 
court issued the warrant? 
1 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that [the 
Court] review[s] for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 
1185 (Utah 2004) . 
"[The Court] review[s] . . . findings of fact supporting a 
trial court's decision on a motion to suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard," State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), and "in assessing the trial court's legal conclusions 
. . . afford[s] it no deference but appl[ies] a 'correction of 
error' standard."7 State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
For issues "not properly objected to" before the trial court, 
the appellant must demonstrate plain error - that is, an "obvious" 
error that "is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. See Addendum A. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
Defendant, Ronnie Curry, received a citation for possession of 
a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia on February 
18, 2C04, R. 1. Defendant's counsel, Victor Gordon, filed a motion 
to suppress on April 23, 2004, setting forth the Defendant's 
2 
alleged facts and argument. R. 19-23. Roosevelt City (the City) 
responded on May 5, 2004. R. 33-42. On July 27, 2004, the trial 
court held a hearing to rule on the motion to suppress. Defendant 
was present but his counsel did not appear. At the hearing on that 
motion, the trial court stated that, "[the court was] prepared to 
rule" based on the memoranda submitted by counsel. R. 121:9:18. 
Following a brief discussion, the court ruled based on the 
arguments advanced by Defendant in his memorandum, finding those 
arguments insufficient to sustain his motion to suppress and denied 
the motion. R. 47-48; 121:9-13. The trial court then held several 
status hearings trying to set a trial date. R. 52-53, R. 56-57, and 
R. 63-64. On January 20, 2005, the court appointed Defendant's 
current counsel. R. 67-69. On March 31, 2005, Defendant entered 
conditional pleas of guilty to the charges, reserving the right to 
appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. R. 89-90. The trial 
court sentenced Defendant on August 18, 2005, staying the sentence 
until the resolution of this appeal R. 122-125. 
Facts 
Rory Curry, the brother of Defendant Ronnie Curry, was on 
probation with Adult Probation & Parole (AP &P). R. 33. Under the 
probation agreement, Rory consented to visits at "[his] place of 
residence, [his] employment, or elsewhere by officers of [AP & P] 
for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of the 
Probation Agreement." R. 33. On February 17th, Agent Shawn Lewis, 
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a probation officer, attempted to conduct a field visit at the 
address that Rory had provided to AP&P. R. 34. 
Agent Lewis, however, did not find him at the address. R. 34. 
Officers from Roosevelt City, who accompanied agent Lewis, informed 
him that Rory may have moved in with his brother, Defendant. R. 34. 
This was a violation of Rory's probation agreement, R. 36, and 
based upon that information, Agent Lewis, accompanied by Ammon 
Manning, of the Roosevelt City Police Department, arrived at 
Defendant's residence at approximately 10:15 p.m. R. 34. Defendant 
responded to the knock at the door, and swung the door wide open. 
R. 34. Immediately upon Defendant's opening the door, Agent Lewis 
stated that he was looking for Rory, and at the same time, Agent 
Lewis saw Rory in the living room of the single-wide trailer home. 
R. 34. 
Agent Lewis requested that Rory speak with him about his 
residence and problems with his compliance with the terms of 
probation. R. 34. Rory consented to speak with Agent Lewis. R. 34. 
Agent Lewis asked Rory if he was living at the residence, to which 
Rory replied affirmatively. R. 34. Agent Lewis then asked if they 
could speak privately. R. 34. Rory led Agent Lewis to a bedroom 
toward the back of the trailer. R. 34. While speaking with Rory in 
the bedroom, Agent Lewis noticed that Rory's eyes were very 
bloodshot and watery and his pupils were dilated. R. 34. During 
that conversation, Rory admitted that he had smoked marijuana at 
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that residence earlier in the day. R. 34. Agent Lewis also detected 
the smell of raw marijuana in the room in which they were speaking. 
R. 34. Agent Lewis did not conduct a search at that time, but 
arrested Rory Curry for probation violations. R. 34. 
Meanwhile, Officer Manning, who accompanied Agent Lewis into 
the home, remained in the living room with Defendant and his 
sister, Rayma Curry. R. 34. While waiting for Agent Lewis, Officer 
Manning observed a white paper plate on a countertop between the 
living room and kitchen. R. 35. Atop the plate appeared to be 
fragments of marijuana. R. 35. Based on Rory's admission of smoking 
marijuana earlier in the day at the home, the odor of marijuana in 
the bedroom, and Officer Manning's observation of the substance on 
the paper plate, Officer Manning believed there was probable cause 
to obtain a search warrant to inspect the home. R. 35. 
Officer Manning went to obtain the warrant, while other 
Roosevelt City officers stayed at the residence with Defendant 
Rayma. R. 35. Defendant and Rayma were not in custody, or under 
arrest, R. 35, but stayed in the home and watched television until 
the warrant was secured. R. 35. Upon searching the residence, the 
officers located marijuana and paraphernalia in the residence and 
Defendant and Rayma were arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance, and paraphernalia. R. 35. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his counsel's 
absence from the suppression hearing. Mr. Gordon submitted a motion 
containing substantial factual and legal argument, and the City 
responded. At the hearing, the trial court ruled based upon the 
submissions of the parties. The court concluded that further 
evidence or argument was unnecessary, and that the argument and 
facts alleged by the Defendant were not sufficient to sustain a 
motion to suppress and, therefore, denied the motion. 
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The 
probation officers had a right to detain and talk to Rory Curry. 
They were invited into the home and while in the home observed 
facts providing probable cause to obtain a warrant. The warrant 
was obtained, and the search of the home after receipt of the 
warrant resulted in the discovery of evidence of drug possession by 
Defendant. 
The absence of the original affidavit supporting the warrant 
and the warrant in the file is not a basis for reversal. When 
items are missing from the record, the Court invokes the 
presumption that the proceedings below were in order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HOLDING OF THE SUPPRESSION HEARING IN THE ABSENCE 
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT HARM DEFENDANT, AS THE TRIAL 
COURT RULED ON THE SUBMISSIONS BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
FINDING THEM INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE MOTION. 
6 
"As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment 
violation [of the right to counsel] must demonstrate *a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Mickens v. 
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002). "[T]here is an exception to this 
general rule." Id.. " [The Supreme Court] ha[s] spared the defendant 
the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome and ha[s] 
simply presumed such effect, where the assistance of counsel has 
been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding." 
Id. ; see also Waastaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 
(1984)) (xxxThe Court has uniformly found constitutional error 
without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally 
absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical 
stage of the proceeding.'"). 
In Woodward v. State, the couri noted the policies 
underpinning Cronic which inform its interpretation, observing: 
In our evaluation . . . , we begin by recognizing that the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
recognized not for its own sake, bui because of the 
effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a 
fair trial. Absent some effect of the challenged conduct 
on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee is generally no: implicated . . . . 
Thus, we do not view counsel's performance in the 
abstract, but rather the impact of counsel's performance 
upon "what after all, is [the accused's], not counsel's 
trial." 
996 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. App. Houston ;ist Dist.l 1999, pec. 
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ref'd, cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1092 2000) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 658, n.22) (emphasis added by Woodward Court). 
That Court further stated "[W]e are not to judge the record in 
the abstract. Rather, we are to determine whether the particular 
circumstance involved here was 'so likely to prejudice' appellant 
that constitutional error occurred." id. at 928 (emphasis in 
original). Accordingly, the court found that, "the reading back to 
the jury of testimony [during counsel's absence] . . . was not 
prejudicial to [the] appellant, and was not a 'critical stage' of 
that proceeding." Id. 
Other courts, have likewise applied a harmless error analysis 
in the wake of Cronic. In People v. Carracedo, for instance, the 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York, confronted with an 
"overnight ban on consultation between defendant and his attorney 
[which] occurred during the course of [a] suppression 
hearing," 89 N.Y.2d 1059, 1061 (1997), opined that it "[could] not 
conclude that the pretrial violation . . . was 'so serious that 
[it] operate[d] to deny defendant's fundamental right to a fair 
trial/ thereby obviating the need to conduct a prejudice 
analysis." .Id., at 1062 (emphasis in original) . In part relying upon 
Carracedo, another New York court, "conclude[d] that the 
deprivation of a defendant's right to counsel at: a pretrial 
suppression hearing is subject to constitutional harmless error 
analysis/' People v. Wardlaw, 794 :i.Y.S.2d 524, VI (N.Y. App. Div. 
8 
2005), Iv granted 5 N.Y.3d 771 [2005]), noting "[a]s an obvious 
illustration of the principle, . . . a situation in which a 
defendant was improperly permitted to proceed pro se but 
nevertheless succeeded in obtaining suppression of the evidence in 
question." Id. 
The court in Wilson v. State, 764 So. 2d 813, 817 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000, cert, denied 534 U.S. 859 2001), reached a similar 
result "hold[ing] that the in-court discussion in response to . . 
. [a] jury's note . . . was in violation of Wilson's constitutional 
right to counsel/' Nevertheless, the court opined that xx[t]he 
absence of counsel during a critical stage is not always a 
structural defect automatically requiring a reviewing court to 
bypass harmless error analysis." Id. at 818. In explanation, the 
court referred to Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), 
asserting that "the Supreme Court clarified in . . . [that case 
that] absence or deprivation of counsel does not entitle a 
defendant to an automatic reversal; instead, reversal is only 
automatic when such deprivation of counsel Effected - and 
contaminated - the entire criminal proceeding.'" Wilson, 764 So. 2d 
at 818 (quoting Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257). Thus, the court did 
not reverse when xx[t]he [trial] court did nothing that could have 
influenced the jury's verdict; [and] there was no contact with the 
jury that might have been altered by input from defense counsel." 
Wilson, 764 So. 2d at 819. 
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In'short, these courts consider harmless error either because 
the stage is not considered critical or because, even if critical, 
the lack of counsel did not "contaminate . . . the proceeding." Jd. 
at 818 (quoting Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257). In other words, the 
analysis "turns on an assessment of the usefulness of counsel to 
the accused at that particular proceeding." Woodward, 996 S.W.2d 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
In the case at hand, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's 
absence, because the trial court was prepared to rule on and deny 
the motion based upon the memorandum filed by Defendant. R. at 
121:9:17-18. The trial court, having read and considered the 
factual and legal contentions of the Defendant, denied the motion 
without the need of testimony or argument. It is true that the 
court allowed the City to proffer, R. at 121:9:17-18, but the 
proffer set forth essentially the same facts as in the City's 
motion, and there is no indication that it had any effect on the 
court's decision. Accordingly, counsel's presence would not have 
had an impact. Therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by the 
absence of counsel, and this Court need not disturb the trial 
court's action. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
WAS APPROPRIATE, AS THE OFFICERS ACTED LAWFULLY IN 
SEEKING A PROBATIONER WHO WAS IN VIOLATION OF HIS 
PROBATION AND A RESIDENT IN DEFENDANT'S HOME, AND IN 
CONDUCTING A SEARCH PURSUANT TO A WARRANT. 
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The trial court concluded that the allegations of Defendant in 
his motion (which is essentially a motion combined with a 
memorandum as it recites numerous factual allegations and cites 
legal authority to buttress his arguments) did not warrant 
suppression or further inquiry as the court announced an intention 
to rule on the motions without further evidence or argument. R. 
121:9:17-18. "The key," according to the court, "[wa]s that Rory 
was on probation." R. 121:12:17-18. 
Rory Curry, was residing with the Defendant. Rory Curry was 
at the residence and admitted he was residing there when confronted 
by the probation agent. The terms of Rory Curry's probation 
allowed Agent Lewis to visit him anywhere, and having seen him in 
plain sight through an open doorway, Agent Lewis could conduct a 
visit with him about his probation. Rory's probation status makes 
an enormous difference, because XN[i]t is abundantly clear that 
probationers Mo not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every 
citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly 
dependent on observance of special . . . restrictions.'" State v. 
Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Griffin 
v. Wisconsin, 436 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)) (further citations 
omitted). Consequently, in the case of probationers, a search cf 
-he probationer's residence is authorized if "the [probation] 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the probationer has 
committed a probation violation or crime, and [if] . . . the search 
11 
is reasonably related to the probation officer's duty.'" State v, 
Davis, 965 P. 2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1987)). XN>[S]earches have 
generally been upheld where the p[robation] officer's suspicion is 
based only on a tip by an anonymous informer, the police, or other 
sources, '" Martinez, 811 P. 2d at 209, and the probation officer may 
search the residence even if the probationer is absent. Id. 
Moreover, 
by accepting the terms of probation, [a 
probationer] consent [s] to searches of any areas of the 
residence over which he [or she] ha[s] common authority 
. . ., and . . . officers c[an] premise their search of 
these areas on reasonable suspicion that [the 
probationer] ha[s] violated a condition of his [or her] 
probation. This [i]s a risk [a co-resident] assume [s] by 
living with . . . a probationer. 
Davis, 965 P.2d at 532. 
In the instant circumstances, Agent Lewis had a reasonable 
suspicion that Rory was violating his probation. Rory was not at 
the address provided to Adult Probation and Parole, and Agent Lewis 
received a tip from the police that Rory may have moved to the home 
of Defendant. R. 34. He followed up on the tip and found that 
indeed Rory Curry was residing at Defendant's home. R. 34. 
Even if Agent Lewis had been mistaken about Rory residing in 
the home, he was justified in entering the home based upon the 
reasonable belief that it was Rory's residence. "It is settled that 
where probation officers . . . are justified in conducting a 
warrantless search of a probationer's residence, they may search a 
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residence reasonably believed to be the probationer's." People v. 
Palmguist, 123 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 (1981). 
In People v. Kanos, for example, the police obtained 
"information from a confidential informant . . . that [the] 
defendant was again living at [an address]," 14 Cal.App.3d 642, 646 
(1971), and "Special Parole Agent Chris Brett . . . received 
information from the Los Angeles Police Department that a reliable 
source had told them that [the] defendant would be at . . . [the 
address]." .Id.. The "[d]efendant and his brother testified that . . 
. [the] defendant had [in fact] lived continuously with his mother 
at [another address] . . . ." Ld. at 647. Nonetheless, the court 
found that "[t]he search of the apartment as that of [the] 
defendant was permissible," icl. at 648, because "[t]he agents 
reasonably believed . . . [it] was [the] defendant's residence." 
Id.1 
Significantly, although the officers were entitled to search 
the home they reasonably believed to be Rory's residence, they did 
not proceed with a search until acquiring a warrant, R. at 35, and 
officers properly waited with Defendant and his sister as Officer 
I 
Although Utah courts do not appear to have announced this rule 
in such clear terms, in Martinez, the probation M[o]fficer . . . 
went to an apartment located at 8070 West 3500 South, number 23, 
where he believed Martinez lived," 811 P.2d at 207, although the 
"probation agreement . . . listed [Martinez's] address as 8076 West 
3500 South, #23," id. n.l, because NNhe had been to the apartment 
complex before and found that the only apartment 23 was located at 
8070 West, not 8076 West." id. 
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Manning went to secure the warrant. R. at 35. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court, in Illinois v. McArthur, noted that "[the Court] ha[d] found 
no case in which th[e] Court . . . held unlawful a temporary 
seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to 
prevent the loss of evidence while the police obtained a warrant in 
a reasonable period of time." 531 U.S. 326, 334 (2001). 
The officers acted appropriately, and the trial court had 
ample reason to deny the motion to suppress. 
III. THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTING 
THE WARRANT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AS IT IS 
FIRST RAISED ON APPEAL, AND, IN ANY CASE, THE WARRANT WAS 
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE GLEANED FROM THE OFFICERS' 
OWN SENSES AND THE WORDS OF THE PROBATIONER. 
Defendant challenges the probable cause supporting the 
warrant, and concedes that this issue was not raised before the 
trial court. Br. of Appellant at 43. "[Mjatters not placed in issue 
at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1167 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
What is more, the warrant was supported by probable cause. 
"'In general, probable cause means a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" State v. 
Alvarez, 111 P.3d 808, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting State v. 
Yoder, 935 P. 2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). In the instant 
case, the basis for the warrant was derived from the officers' own 
experiences, not that of others. The officers' saw and smelled the 
marijuana. Additionally, Rory admitted using marijuana in the 
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residence earlier that day. Based on the these facts, there was 
certainly " xa fair probability that contraband . . .,.w[ould] be 
found,'" id., and the judge properly issued the warrant. 
To defeat this result, Defendant contends that the affidavit 
supporting the warrant was misleading because Officer Manning did 
not disclose that the officers were in the home "illegally,'' Br. of 
Appellant at 42 (emphasis removed), and because "[it] misrepresents 
that the alleged field visit was to the probationer' [sic] 
address." Br. of Appellant at 40. Obviously, the officers, in 
securing the warrant, did not state that they were in the home 
illegally, because they were not. Agent Lewis was entitled to 
enter a residence reasonably believed to be Rory' s home due to 
Rory's probation status, and, in any case, the officers entered to 
speak with Rory only after observing him through an open doorway, 
asking to speak with him and being invited in. R. at 34. 
Additionally, although the officers believed it was Rory's address, 
the affidavit does not affirmatively state such, but says only that 
XNth[e] affiant and Agent Shawn Lewis went to the residence to do a 
field visit with Rory Curry." Aff. and Order for Search Warrant 1 
5. Agent Lewis was entitled to attempt visits not only at Rory's 
home, but at any location. In sum, the affidavit was both truthful 
and supported by probable cause. 
IV. DEFENDANT DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE HOW COUNSEL'S ALLEGED 
IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE INJURED DEFENDANT, WHICH DEFENDANT 
MUST ESTABLISH TO PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM. 
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Defendant's fourth and fifth points are a repetition of the 
first. Thus, the City would respectfully request that the Court 
refer to the prior arguments. To the extent that Defendant 
believes that Defendant's right to counsel was violated other than 
at the suppression hearing, it is not clear how his right to 
counsel was denied or how he was prejudiced. After all, 
Defendant's own statement of the facts illustrates that Defendant 
was represented by Victor Gordon up until the time that current 
counsel was appointed, that the court repeatedly accommodated Mr. 
Gordon, and, in any event, that nothing of consequence occurred 
between the suppression hearing and Ms. Doherty's appointment as 
counsel. Br. of Appellant at 23-25, 47-48. "An error by counsel, 
even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside 
the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error ha[s] no effect 
on the judgment.'' Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 691 
(1984). "Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance 
must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution." Ici. at 692. 
V. THE LACK OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE WARRANT AND 
THE WARRANT IN THE RECORD DOES NOT NULLIFY THOSE 
DOCUMENTS, DUE TO THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISPOSITION IN THE FACE OF AN INCOMPLETE RECORD 
AND BECAUSE THE WARRANT'S EXISTENCE IS NOT IN QUESTION. 
Defendant's final argument is that the lack of the warrant in 
the record "invalidates" it. Br. of Appellant at 48. As stated by 
this Court in State v. Rawlinqs, however, "[i]n the absence of an 
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adequate record on appeal, [the Court] cannot address the issues 
raised and . . . presume [s] the correctness of the disposition made 
by the trial court." 829 P.2d 150, 152-153 (1992). 
Furthermore, under somewhat similar circumstances, in United 
States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985), 
"[t]he original warrant and supporting affidavit authorizing the 
search of [the] appellant's residence . . . [were] not contained in 
the record . . . ." "Apparently, these documents were lost prior to 
the suppression hearing." Ld. Nevertheless, the court upheld the 
warrant. IdL at 616. Likewise, in the case at hand, there is no 
need to cast the warrant aside. There is no doubt that it existed. 
Indeed, the trial court actually issued the warrant. R. at 
121:11:4-12. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Roosevelt City, 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's 
decision on Defendant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this Ly day of April, 2006. 
A1LRED & McCLELLAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDA 
A. U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
B. U.S. Const, amend. VI." 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
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